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Prior Alliances with Targets and Acquisition Performance
in Knowledge-Intensive Industries

ABSTRACT

An important focus of the research on mergers and acquisitions is the conditions under which acquisitions
create value for the acquiring firm‘s shareholders. Given that the acquisition process is plagued by serious
issues of information asymmetry, which are exacerbated in the context of knowledge acquisitions, we
examine whether prior alliances with potential targets reduce the information asymmetry enough to create
‗partner-specific absorptive capacity‘ and yield superior stock returns upon acquisition compared to
acquisitions not preceded by alliances. We test our hypotheses on a sample of high-technology
acquisitions by US firms during 1990-98 using an event study methodology to assess abnormal stock
returns. We find, unexpectedly, that no significant general effect emerges for acquisitions with prior
alliances. However, international acquisitions following alliances show significantly better returns
relative to both acquisitions without prior alliances and to domestic acquisitions. Additionally, stronger
forms of prior alliances lead to better acquisition performance than weaker forms of alliances. Together,
the results broadly support our thesis that partner-specific absorptive capacity may be at work and suggest
that under certain prior alliance conditions, acquisitions can indeed create value for acquirers.

Key words: Alliances; Mergers and Acquisitions; Acquisition performance; Partner-specific absorptive
capacity; Information asymmetry; Strong alliances; Knowledge-intensive industries.

2

Whether and how acquisitions create economic value are key questions in strategy research (Haspeslagh
and Jemison 1991; Hitt et al. 2001). Empirical evidence shows that acquisitions are generally
unremunerative for the shareholders of the acquiring firm (Sirower 1997), averaging zero or even slightly
negative returns, despite the existence of supposed synergies (Andrade et al. 2001; Bradley et al.1988;
Jensen and Ruback 1983). However, while most studies agree that acquirers on average break even at
best, few dwell on the fact that behind the mean of zero there exists a sizable variance. There are plentiful
instances where shareholders of the successful acquirers earn large positive returns (e.g. Cisco, GE, Intel),
while other acquisitions (e.g. IBM-Lotus or Novel-Word Perfect) generate significant losses for acquiring
firm shareholders (Capron and Pistre 2002). Thus, an area of considerable interest in strategy research is
concerned with the conditions under which acquirers earn superior returns.
Earning superior returns from the acquirer‘s perspective becomes even more of a challenge if the
target firm is a knowledge-intensive one. We define a knowledge-intensive firm as one that has
significant knowledge-based assets, which consist of proprietary knowledge (e.g. patents, trade marks,
trade secrets and so on) and tacit knowledge residing in individual employees‘ minds or embedded in
organizational routines, experience, processes or networks. Although one of the key motivations behind
corporate acquisition is gaining access to the knowledge-based assets of the target firm (Barney 1988, Chi
1994, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991), acquiring knowledge assets poses serious organizational and
management challenges because knowledge may be tacit (Polanyi, 1963) and embedded in individual,
group, organization, or network levels; or intertwined and ‗bundled‘ with other resources (Nonaka1994,
Nonaka and von Krogh 2009). Such embedding and bundling, along with tacitness, makes knowledge
difficult to acquire or appropriate in factor markets or otherwise (Coff 1999, Kogut and Zander 1992,
Liebeskind 1996, Mowery et al. 1996). More broadly, theory suggests that problems associated with
acquiring knowledge-based assets are primarily twofold: ex ante market failure due to information
asymmetry (Arrow 1974; Balakrishnan and Koza 1993; Teece 1980; Williamson 1985) between the
acquiring and the target firms; and ex post organization failure due to the difficulty in integrating the
target firm‘s knowledge assets into the acquiring firm after the acquisition (Hennart 1988, Hennart and
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Reddy 2000, Puranam et al. 2009) . Together, the set of ex ante and ex post problems make knowledge
acquisitions particularly challenging.
Thus, an important issue facing potential knowledge acquirers, and researchers studying the
question, is ascertaining what might be potential solutions to the problems of properly assessing the value
of, and subsequently integrating, knowledge-based assets, and how effective the solutions are. One option
to deal with such apparent market failure (Teece 1980) may be to limit the acquisition of knowledgeintensive target firms. However, anecdotal evidence and academic literature suggest that, to the contrary,
firms‘ recent acquisitions seem to focus to an even greater extent than previously on knowledge-intensive
acquisitions in industries such as business and health services, software, and precision medical equipment
(Mergers & Acquisitions 1999).
Prior studies suggest that acquirers of knowledge-based assets take steps to reduce the
information asymmetry problem by forming prior alliances with the target, which can be used as
intermediate pre-acquisition strategic options. That is, an alliance can be used to reduce information
asymmetry by learning more about the target‘s assets and assessing their true value before deciding on an
acquisition. For example, Bowman and Hurry (1993) use an option lens to explain the strategy of
sequentially exercising small investments in alliances and waiting for an opportune time to strike the
option of acquisition. In the high-technology Application Specific Integrated Circuits industry,
Vanhaverbeke et al. (2002) find that a series of strategic alliances between partners increased the
probability that one partner would ultimately acquire the other. However, this study does not investigate
whether or not the prior alliances affected acquisition performance.
Research evidence to date on the effect of prior alliances on acquisition performance has been
mixed. Porrini (2004) examines the effect of having alliances with targets prior to acquisitions on the
ROA (return on assets) of the acquiring firm. While Porrini finds that post-acquisition ROA is improved
when acquirers have previous alliances with target firms, the dataset in her study is restricted by being
limited to only acquisitions of public targets in the manufacturing sector, which comprise a mere 15% of
technology acquisitions. However, recent research (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006) showing that no general
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effect exists for alliances prior to acquisitions offers a contrasting view and a precedent for the notion that
the effect of prior alliances may be contingent on other factors, although these scholars do not investigate
what the other factors may be. Thus, there are good reasons to investigate the issue more thoroughly.
In the current paper, we advance extant research by elucidating the conditions under which
forming prior alliances with targets lead to improved acquisition performance. Besides assessing the main
effects of this strategy on performance, we examine whether prior alliances are particularly useful in
international contexts (where information asymmetry is pronounced) or when the alliance involves
intense interaction between the partners before the acquisition. Our sample includes all targets—public
and private—in both manufacturing and service high-technology (high-tech) sectors, and in a further
distinction from Porrini (2004) we use the event study methodology to assess acquisition performance.
Though not without limitations, this methodology has the advantage of isolating the performance effects
of the acquisition event more directly than does ROA, and has been extensively used in acquisition
studies in the strategy literature (e.g., Seth 1990; Singh and Montgomery 1987).
Our findings are interesting in that the main effect differs from that of Porrini (2004) – we find no
general impact of prior alliances on acquisition performance. However, we find nuanced results which
suggest that prior alliances with acquisition targets can, under conditions of exacerbated information
asymmetry or of intense interaction amongst partners, produce superior acquisition performance. In
particular, we find that international acquisitions with prior alliances create greater shareholder value, as
do acquisitions that follow stronger forms of alliances, than comparable acquisitions without prior
alliances. In the rest of this paper, as is customary, we begin with theory and hypotheses below, before
proceeding to the methods, results, and discussion.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
As mentioned earlier, theory suggests that two sets of problems are associated with acquiring knowledgebased assets: ex ante problems from market failure due to information asymmetry between the acquiring
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and the target firms; and ex post organization failure due to the problems of integrating the target firm‘s
knowledge assets into the acquiring firm after the acquisition has taken place. We discuss each below.

Problems of Information Asymmetry
Ex-ante market failure arises because acquirers usually possess less accurate information about the quality
and value of the knowledge-based assets of a potential target than the target itself does. More
specifically, information asymmetry between the acquiring and the target firm creates uncertainty about
the quality and value of the target firm‘s assets, leading to problems of adverse selection (Akerlof 1970).
In other words, available potential targets could well be ‗lemons‘ (intrinsically of poor quality), while
those of better quality may be available only at prices higher than buyers are prepared to pay. The notion
of information asymmetry in this context hinges on the fundamental imbalance in the information
possessed by the potential acquirer and target firms, as opposed to the simple insufficiency of knowledge
about the potential target held by the potential acquirer.
Potential acquirers have much less information about the quality of a firm‘s knowledge base than
about its tangible assets and physical capital because knowledge-based assets are harder to assess and
appraise than are tangible assets (Chi 1994) and financial statements provide scant information about
intangible knowledge assets. Typically, accurate information about the quality, performance
characteristics, and value of the knowledge assets of the target firm is not common knowledge. Preacquisition due diligence does not resolve the problem either, as the potential for information asymmetry
allows self-interested sellers and their agents to opportunistically misrepresent the true value of their
firms, causing the acquiring firm to incur extra costs in identifying lemons and safeguarding themselves
against misrepresentation. This makes potential acquirers—the buyers of such assets—uncertain about the
‗true‘ value of the target.
Even if misrepresentation is unintentional, the difference in the knowledge held by the acquirer
and target firms creates an information asymmetry issue. For example, a software developer target might
be overly optimistic regarding the timeline for the release of a major new generation of its software. In
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such cases, it would be difficult for the potential acquirer to obtain an accurate idea of the stage and state
of the future release beyond the alleged release date. If an acquirer‘s decision to purchase the software
developer hinged on the successful release of the new product, the misrepresentation, whether intentional
or not, would greatly affect subsequent acquisition performance. The success of such a knowledge
acquisition would hinge significantly not only on the actual time to project completion, but also on subtle
but key characteristics of the target firm such as its capabilities, skills, culture and how these dimensions
complement those of the potential acquirer—which are difficult to assess ex ante.
Coff (1999) identifies three types of uncertainty regarding the target firm‘s knowledge-based
assets: (i) uncertainty about the quality of assets, since these may include significant tacit elements; (ii)
uncertainty about what can be transferred, since even if the acquiring firm is able to ascertain asset quality
substantial uncertainty exists about what part and how much of these assets can actually be transferred to
the acquirer post acquisition; and (iii) uncertainty about the prospects for synergy. Prospective synergy is
about seeing the future potential without being able to directly observe and assess the combined
capabilities of the acquiring and the target firms and thus, by definition, is speculative. In their classic
work on acquisitions, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) note that it is difficult to specify, ex ante, how
much knowledge can be transferred and whether the knowledge can be utilized in a new setting, even if
the target cooperates enthusiastically. The information asymmetry about the target‘s knowledge assets
and uncertainty about its value make buyers often overvalue knowledge assets in their excitement and
enthusiasm for ‗winning‘ the acquisition over competing bidders. The eventual acquirer frequently ends
up ‗accursed‘ (‗the winner‘s curse‘) by paying more than the target assets are worth (Giliberto and
Varaiya 1989). In fact, research has shown that greater premiums may hurt post-acquisition performance
(Krishnan et al. 2007).

Problems in Post-Acquisition Integration
Knowledge, in particular the tacit variety, resides inside individuals‘ minds, is embedded in
organizational routines, experience, and networks (Nonaka 1994, Nonaka and von Krogh 2009) as well as
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bundled with other resources. Consequently, acquiring firms find it difficult to extricate knowledge assets
out from the target and disentangle the desirable assets from the undesirable ones. As suggested by the socalled ‗indigestibility‘ argument, ex post transaction costs are high when desired assets are ‗comingled‘ in
this way, leading to poor post-acquisition integration (Hennart 1988; Hennart and Reddy 1997).
Moreover, the acquisition contract is often incomplete and lacks the binding power to ensure a
complete transfer of the intangible assets of the target firm (Williamson 1985). The acquiring firm usually
has little recourse in dealing with the target firm‘s ex post opportunism in withholding tacit information.
A further post-acquisition problem that acquiring firms face involves the retention of target firm scientists
and executives, since talent often represents one of the critical strategic assets acquirers hope to obtain
from the target, particularly in the case of knowledge-intensive acquisitions (Jemison and Sitkin 1986).
When managers and scientists leave the target following an acquisition, critical knowledge assets, as well
as knowledge about the target company and its operating environment, are lost (Walsh 1988).
Integration of target assets into the acquiring firm also entails several other problems, including
lack of knowledge of the target assets and difficulty in finding and transferring such assets into the
acquiring firm (Puranam et al. 2006, 2009). Often what is promised or understood during pre-acquisition
negotiation or the due diligence process does not match with what is ‗discovered‘ in the target company
post acquisition. Furthermore, even if the acquiring firm identifies the promised assets in the target firm,
the tacitness of knowledge assets makes them extremely difficult (or ‗sticky‘) to transfer even within the
same organization (Szulanski 1996, Nonaka and von Krogh 2009), let alone across organizational
boundaries to another firm (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995).
In sum, the acquisition of knowledge assets is complicated by significant information asymmetry
problems, both ex ante and ex post. We present arguments below to suggest that prior alliances with
target firms may alleviate these problems.
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Prior Alliances and Partner-specific Absorptive Capacity
Alliances are voluntarily-initiated cooperative agreements between firms that involve mutual investment,
exchange, sharing, or co-development of products, technologies, or services (Gulati 1998). A strategic
alliance in the form of a joint venture, for instance, helps a firm learn valuable information about its
partner‘s resources, capabilities, and reliability. In this vein, Balakrishnan and Koza argue that joint
ventures ―can induce information revelation and mitigate the adverse selection problem. There may be
short-term gains from misrepresentations, but the threat of termination of the joint-venture or its potential
liquidation because of the resulting downstream inefficiencies, will offset these gains and reduce the
incentives to misrepresent‖ (1993: 103-104). A prior alliance with the target can provide the acquiring
firm with detailed information about the organization which allows the acquirer to assess how much
synergy to expect, how much the target is worth, and in the end, whether or not to acquire the target (Burt
1992; Gulati 1999). Moreover, a prior alliance with the target also helps the acquirer understand the
target‘s potential compatibility with the acquirer, both strategically and organizationally (Kale et al.
2000). Research shows that a lack of compatibility or misfit in culture, strategy, or business practices can
seriously compromise acquisition performance (Chatterjee et al. 1992). Prior alliances with targets allow
acquiring firms to avoid such costly mistakes.
Strategic alliances offer partners the opportunity to learn from and about each other, which has
been shown to be an important element of alliance value creation (Anand and Khanna 2000a; Inkpen
1998, Sarkar et al. 2009). Alliances facilitate learning when partners absorb and exchange information,
capabilities, and skills from and with each other (Kale et al. 2000; Khanna et al. 1998). A prior alliance
with the target can provide the acquiring firm with ‗absorptive‘ and ‗communicative‘ capabilities
(Larsson et al. 1998), which may help the acquirer develop strategies, routines, and capabilities to better
access and exchange resources with the target post acquisition (Dyer and Singh 1998, Kale et al. 2000).
A prior target alliance thus helps the acquiring firm develop knowledge related to the specific alliance
partner firm, which scholars have referred to as ‗partner-specific absorptive capacity‘ (Dyer and Singh,
1998, Gulati et al. 2008). Other scholars have discussed similar notions using terms such as ‗partner-
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specific alliance experience‘ (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005) and ‗interorganizational routines‘ (Zollo et
al., 2002).
The concept of partner-specific absorptive capacity implies that ―a firm has developed the ability
to recognize and assimilate valuable knowledge from a particular alliance partner‖ (Dyer and Singh,
1998: 665; italics in the original). The concept draws on the overall idea of absorptive capacity, which in
this setting refers to the acquiring firm‘s capacity to identify, internalize, assimilate and apply knowledge
from an external source (Cohen and Levinthal 1990); in our case, the potential target. Partner-specific
absorptive capacity, developed through a prior alliance with the target, can also help the acquirer to
manage conflict in the post-acquisition phase better (Arino and Torres de la 1998). Thus, such targetspecific knowledge capital helps an acquirer identify the relevant knowledge resources that exist in the
target, ‗disentangle‘ the desirable knowledge assets from the undesirable ones (i.e. overcome
‗indigestibility‘), develop knowledge-sharing routines to improve learning efficiency, and better manage
conflict during the post-acquisition process, thereby leading to more successful post acquisition
integration outcomes.
A prior alliance with the target can also build mutual trust between the partners which eventually
helps the acquiring firm better integrate the target following the acquisition. Previous studies suggest that
prior repeated ties enhance trust between partners (Gulati 1995). Zaheer et al. (1998) find that trust
reduces negotiating costs and also improves alliance performance. Kale et al. (2000) argue that ‗relational
capital,‘ developed through mutual trust and interaction at the individual level between alliance partners,
forms the basis for learning and know-how transfer across partners. Trust between the acquiring and the
acquired firm not only enhances the efficacy of knowledge absorption and exchange between the partners
post acquisition, but also creates a sense of belonging among the acquired scientists and executives that
may induce them to remain in the acquired firm after the acquisition (Finkelstein et al. 1998), and
facilitates value creation through active participation by acquired managers in the post-acquisition
integration process (Graebner 2004). In knowledge-intensive industries, the managers and scientists are
the primary knowledge assets, and often the main objective of the acquisition is to gain access to the
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target‘s key employees. Thus, a prior alliance with the target helps acquiring firms retain target
employees by building target-specific relational capital which eventually enhances post-acquisition
integration performance.
In fact, extant literature in strategy suggests that strategic alliances sometimes end in acquisitions
(Kogut 1988, Bleeke and Ernst 1993, Garette and Dussauge 2000). Consistent with these empirical
findings, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) note: ―In many cases, collaboration is the first productive step
toward understanding the business, market, or industry before a complete acquisition‖ (p. 247). Studies
have also suggested that firms can use prior alliances as intermediate strategic options (Kogut 1991,
Bowman and Hurry 1993) to eventually acquire the partner. However, none of the above-mentioned
studies examine whether acquisitions after prior alliances actually influence acquisition performance.
In sum, we argue that prior alliances with targets can improve acquisition performance by
creating partner-specific absorptive capacity and thereby ameliorating the two main problems associated
with acquiring knowledge-intensive targets: ex ante market failure due to information asymmetry between
the acquiring and the target firm and the ex post integration problems of integrating knowledge assets.
Thus we hypothesize,
H1: Acquisitions with prior target alliances will perform better than acquisitions without prior
target alliances.

Prior Alliances with International Targets
A long tradition of literature in international management attests to the costs and difficulties of doing
business abroad (Hymer 1960). These arise not only from geographic distance, but also from cultural,
institutional, and social differences between the home and the host countries. Discrimination against
foreign firms and issues of legitimacy crop up as well to create a sizeable barrier to success in
international operations, which together have been termed the ‗liability of foreignness‘(Zaheer 1995).
We argue that the liability of foreignness is further compounded in the context of knowledge
acquisitions. Not only are international knowledge acquisitions plagued by all the problems of
knowledge acquisitions in general, but information asymmetry is further exacerbated because the context
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is foreign. A lack of understanding of the local culture, politics, society, and institutions, as well as
foreign market and competitive conditions, business practices, and success factors, contributes to greater
‗psychological distance‘ (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). In turn, greater psychological distance adds to the
difficulties of assessing the degree to which the international target possesses valuable knowledge assets,
accurately evaluating what these may be worth, and the extent of any potential synergies with the
acquirer‘s assets. Post-acquisition integration problems are also likely to be enhanced because
disentangling the valuable from the irrelevant knowledge assets, and combining the desirable assets with
those of the acquirer to create synergistic asset combinations is likely to be more difficult when
knowledge resource holders are from a host country different from that of the acquirer (Capron et al.
1998, Hennart 1988).
In consequence, international alliances are likely to be particularly valuable in reducing the
problems of knowledge asset information asymmetry because the benefits of increased partner-specific
absorptive capacity are greater than in domestic settings (Robson et al. 2008). Alliances with local
partners are not only likely to socialize international managers in the customs and business practices of
the host country, thereby reducing psychological distance, but will also eventually contribute to a
reduction in the liability of foreignness by enhancing the legitimacy of the acquiring home country firm
which is now seen to be allied with a local one (Kostova and Zaheer 1999). Together, these processes
will improve the acquirer‘s ability to ascertain the true value of the knowledge assets of the international
target, as well as make it easier to disentangle and integrate the target‘s knowledge assets following the
acquisition.
Some recent research provides support for this notion. Chen and Hennart (2004) find that since
making acquisitions abroad involves high costs of target inspection and contract enforcement due to
information asymmetry, foreign investors are more likely to form an equity alliance (i.e. a partial
acquisition or an ‗acquisition joint venture‘) with the target before they finally acquire it. However, this
study did not examine whether those international acquirers with prior target alliances were more
successful than others that did not form prior alliances. Research on international acquisitions also
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supports the thesis that, under certain conditions, international acquisitions create positive stockholder
returns (Doukas and Travlos 1988; Markides and Ittner 1994), although these studies did not examine the
effect of prior alliances as one of the antecedent conditions. We build on prior research by suggesting that
one of the conditions that make international acquisitions more successful is the existence of a prior
alliance with the international target. In sum, given the severe problems of information asymmetry in
international knowledge contexts, and the likelihood that alliances with international firms are likely to
contribute significantly to reducing them, we propose that international acquisitions will yield better
returns when preceded by previous alliances with the target than when not preceded by such a
relationship. Formally,
H2: When the target is an international firm, acquisitions with prior target alliances will
perform better than acquisitions without prior target alliances.
The previous hypothesis compares international acquisitions that have not been preceded by
alliances with international acquisitions that have been preceded by such alliances. We now make a
further subtle distinction between international acquisitions that have been preceded by alliances and
domestic acquisitions that have also been preceded by alliances. Here we argue that since information
asymmetry between the potential target and acquirer firms is greater in international contexts than in
domestic ones, while prior alliances help develop partner-specific absorptive capacity and learning for all
acquisitions, the effect is likely to be stronger still when the acquisition is international relative to a
domestic one. As well, the resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991) provides additional support for
our logic. In essence, partner-specific absorptive capacity is likely to be harder to access in international
settings than domestic ones. In domestic settings, partner firms will have similar knowledge and
understandings of laws, institutions and operational issues which will enhance their ability to learn about
each other. Consequently, while such partner-specific absorptive capacity will be easier and more likely
to be created in domestic settings, it will also be less rare and therefore less valuable in terms of
generating differential performance after an acquisition. In contrast, firms that are able to access partnerspecific absorptive capacity in international settings through their prior alliances will outperform
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acquirers in domestic settings, even though the latter have had prior alliances, because the partner-specific
absorptive capacity they access will be rarer and therefore more valuable. Formally,
H3: Acquisitions with prior target alliances will perform better when the target is international
than when it is domestic.
Taken together, these two hypotheses highlight that international acquisition strategies may not
be superior to domestic ones per se—except when they are preceded by international alliances that
convey knowledge and information, thereby reducing information asymmetries and creating partnerspecific absorptive capacity.

Strength of Prior Alliances
Although prior alliances have the potential to improve the acquiring firm‘s performance, not all types of
alliances are likely to be equally effective at doing so. Our basic argument in this regard is that the ability
to develop partner-specific absorptive capacity—which subsequently reduces information asymmetry
between the potential target and acquirer—will be contingent upon the frequency and quality of prior
interactions between the two firms, which in turn will be affected by the strength of the alliance
relationship between them.
Research in alliances emphasizes the social process of exchange that characterizes strong ties—
which involve trust, commitment, cooperation, mutuality, and equity—and the positive alliance outcomes
that arise from such elements of the alliance relationship (Granovetter 1985). Granovetter, in a classic
work, defines the strength of a tie as based on a ―combination of the amount of time, the emotional
intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie‖ (1973:
1361). When researching interfirm networks, scholars have typically drawn on Granovetter (1973) and
focused on the amount of time and reciprocal services to measure the tie strength between firms (e.g.
Nohria & Garcia-Pont 1991; Rowley et al. 2000).
In empirical work, Nohria and Garcia-Pont (1991) suggest that the strength of alliance
relationships can vary in terms of their relationship ‗intensity,‘ which is determined by ―resource
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commitments, organizational interdependence, and the ease with which they [the alliances] can be
dissolved‖ (p. 117). A stronger relationship thus involves higher degrees of resource commitments and of
interdependence among partners which implies, among other things, greater levels of interaction in terms
of both quantity and quality. Consider, for example, an R&D joint venture compared to a licensing-only
agreement. Due to the complex, unstructured, and uncertain nature of the joint task, the R&D alliance is
more likely to require organization members to work closely together with those from the partner
organization and is thus likely to involve greater and richer interactions between alliance partners. In
situations in which knowledge assets are required to be assessed, such an alliance is more likely to reduce
information asymmetry between the partners than the weaker licensing-only alliance, in which the
contractual agreement is typically more structured and less ambiguous, but also likely to present fewer
opportunities for rich and deep interaction (Anand and Khanna, 2000b).
Strong interfirm ties possess two main advantages: they provide firms with fine-grained
information and confer benefits of control. Extant research indicates that strong ties are associated with
the exchange of fine-grained information across organizational boundaries (Uzzi 1999). The
development of strong ties builds a foundation for the processing of this rich information. Further, even
during the process of strengthening and deepening interfirm relationships to the level of strong ties,
partners learn about each other‘s organizations and develop shared norms of behavior and a mutual
understanding of each other (Larson 1992). Such intense social relations make the alliance partner‘s
knowledge and information more available, credible, and interpretable. Close and intense interaction
between the members of partner firms also serves as an effective mechanism for the transfer of sticky
knowledge assets (Marsden 1990; von Hippel 1988). Learning efficiency and success in an alliance
depend on an iterative process of exchange between the firms and the extent to which individual members
of the partner firms engage in such interaction (Arrow 1974; Badaracco 1991). Thus, based on a deeper
degree of partner-specific absorptive capacity stemming from intense interaction, information and
knowledge that is tacit and holistic in nature can be more readily and efficiently accessed as well as
transferred across organizational boundaries.
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Strong ties can also serve as part of a social control mechanism, which governs partner behavior
in interfirm relationships. Strategic alliances are associated with a variety of risks and uncertainties (e.g.
Hamel et al. 1989). Organizations entering alliances face considerable moral hazard concerns because of
the unpredictability of the behavior of partners and the likely costs of opportunistic behavior, should it
occur (Gulati 1999). Network scholars have shown that strong ties can incrementally promote and
enhance trust, reciprocity, and a long-term perspective in a relationship (e.g. Larson 1992). By reducing
the likelihood of opportunistic behavior, these elements can help to effectively mitigate the uncertainties
arising from the moral hazard problem in strategic alliances. In this vein, as noted previously, Kale et al.
(2000) argue that frequent and intense exchanges between the members of partner firms enhance trust,
which in turn increases learning via norms of mutual gain and reciprocity between alliance partners
(Powell 1990, Robson et al. 2008).
Consequently, we argue that stronger prior alliances will be more effective in improving
subsequent acquisition performance than weaker prior alliances by reducing the information asymmetry
between the acquiring and target firms because they foster learning and trust. These in turn help reduce
ex ante information asymmetry to create more successful post-acquisition integration. Accordingly,
H4: Acquisitions with stronger prior alliances with targets will perform better than acquisitions
with weaker prior alliances.

METHODS
Data and Sampling Approach
Our sample consists of high-tech acquisitions by US public firms in the period 1990-1998. We selected
this time frame after a preliminary analysis of overall M&A and alliance activity between 1990 and 2004.
Figure 1 plots the number of high-tech acquisitions and alliances over this period, and shows there are
two sharply different periods of activity. Initially, there is a steady increase in the number of acquisitions
and alliances until 1998. This steady period is followed by one of high volatility, with a sharp three-year
spike in acquisitions and alliances between 1999 and 2001, followed by an equally sharp drop thereafter.
This latter time window between 1999 and 2004 corresponds to the ―tech bubble‖ and the subsequent
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instability brought about by its aftermath. To avoid any confounding effects in our findings driven by this
unstable period, we selected the steadier 1990-1998 years to conduct our main analysis. We use the latter
period (1999-2004), however, to assess the robustness of our results and report on it later in the paper.
***Insert Figure 1 about Here***
Data on acquisitions are drawn from the Securities Data Corporation‘s (SDC) Platinum database.
Our sampling universe consists of all high-tech acquisitions by US public firms in the period 1990-1998.
No restrictions were placed on the trading status of the target firms, which allows us to include both
public and private targets (as classified by SDC) in the study. In all cases, the acquirer had to obtain a
majority of the target‘s equity (50.1%) for the transaction to be included in the sample.
To ensure that all acquisitions came from knowledge-intensive industries, target firms were
chosen from high-tech manufacturing and services sectors. Following prior studies (Hagedoorn and
Duysters 2002), we sampled from the following SIC codes: (i) in the manufacturing sector: Drugs and
Medicines (SIC 2833-2836), Computers and Office Equipment (3571-3579), Electrical Equipment (36123652), Communications Equipment (3661-3699), Aerospace and Aircraft (3721, 3724, 3728, 3761, 3764,
3769), Measuring, Photo Equipment and Clocks (3821-3899) and (ii) in the services sector: Computer
Programming, Data Processing etc. (737X), Engineering Services (8711), and R&D and Testing Services
(873X).
We started with a total of 8,647 acquisitions completed during 1990-1998 that met the criteria
listed above. For each deal, we determined whether the acquirer and target had partnered to form an
alliance at any point before the acquisition. To do this, we obtained data from two sources. We began
with alliances listed in SDC‘s Joint Ventures/Alliances database, and complemented the list by searching
Lexis-Nexis and Factiva for news articles reporting collaborative relationships involving the acquirer and
the target. To ensure that we captured all possible alliances, we searched for news that mentioned the
names of the two companies in the same article. After carefully reading the articles, we identified 503
acquisitions in which the acquiring firm had a prior alliance with the target firm. The small percentage
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(around 6%) of prior alliances relative to the 8,647 original acquisitions is consistent with the 7% found
by Porrini (2004) in her sample of only public targets.
Since the focus of the study is to learn whether acquisitions preceded by alliances with the target
perform better than those without prior alliances, we adopt a quasi-experimental research design (Cook
and Campbell 1979), in which we compare M&A performance of the treatment group (i.e. with a prior
alliance) against that of a control group (i.e. without a prior alliance). While we are not able to randomly
assign firms to form or not form alliances prior to merging, we attempt to make both groups as similar as
possible on several characteristics except for whether they had a previous alliance. This matched sample
methodology has been used in several research studies in accounting, finance, strategy, and marketing
literatures (e.g., Bharadwaj 2000, Farrell and Whidbee 2000, Kalwani and Narayandas 1995, Kimbrough
2005, Singh and Harianto 1989).
To create the control group, we first divided our sample in two categories: international and
domestic acquisitions. Then, following Singh and Harianto (1989), we constructed a control group of
acquisitions in each category, in which the transaction occurred no more than a year before or after the
reference acquisition, the acquiring firm had the same two-digit SIC code, was of comparable size
(usually within 15% of the assets) to the focal acquirer in the reference group, but had no prior alliance
with target. The matching process generated a usable set of 408 acquisitions, equally split between those
with and without prior alliances. Thus, of 503 acquisitions with prior alliances in the original reference
group, we had to discard 299 for which there was either no financial data available from Compustat, no
stock price information from CRSP (Centre for Research in Security Prices), or for which we could not
find a suitable match without a previous alliance.
We compared the 408 acquisitions included in the regression analysis with the 8,059 (8,467 –
408) that were not analyzed in this paper to assess the representativeness of our final sample. There were
no differences between included and excluded acquisitions in the size of the acquirer (total assets), the
likelihood of acquiring a foreign or publicly listed target, or the number of payment types used in the
transaction. The acquisitions in the sample however were more likely to be between firms in unrelated

18

industries (p < 0.01 from a two-sided t-test), to involve a higher price paid for the target (p < 0.01), to
occur in later years (p < 0.01), and to include acquirers from the software industry (p < 0.01). In contrast,
acquirers in our analysis were less likely to come from the banking and insurance or from the educational
and medical services industries (p < 0.01).
These differences suggest some important boundary conditions for our results, namely that they
are more likely to hold for unrelated acquisitions, for high-priced acquisitions, and for those in later years,
the latter reflecting the increased importance placed on knowledge in the economy. The bulk of the
industry groups included in the sample (viz. light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, transportation and
communications, and other services) are equally represented in the included and excluded sets, suggesting
that the results generalize to them. In contrast, the results may not apply as fully to the banking,
educational, insurance and medical services industries.

Dependent Variable
Acquisition performance. The dependent variable, acquisition performance, is captured in the acquirer‘s
stock price reaction to the acquisition, as measured by the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over a
specific window surrounding the event announcement. While the benefits accruing to an acquirer from an
acquisition can also be captured through accounting measures of performance (such as ROA), there are
several advantages from using abnormal returns in our case. Abnormal returns allow us to directly trace
performance to each specific acquisition because they capture the stock price reaction to a specific
acquisition for a specific period surrounding its announcement. In contrast, accounting performance can
only be measured in the reporting period after the acquisition is finalized. This raises a challenge because
little intuition or theory exists to guide researchers in selecting precisely when to measure accounting
performance after the acquisition. Even if it were possible to choose the optimal measurement moment, it
is not possible to know if the observed performance driven by a specific acquisition or by a host of other
events that occurred between the date of the acquisition announcement and the calculation of accounting
numbers by the firm—such as other acquisitions, external shocks, product releases, personnel changes
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and so on. As a voluminous literature in financial economics suggests, stock price reactions to events
reflect expectations of future performance (Malkiel 2003 presents a useful review). Importantly, research
has shown that stock market reactions to acquisition announcements correlate well with subsequent
performance of acquisitions (Healy et al. 1992, Sirower 1997). For example, Kaplan and Weisbach (1992)
show that abnormal returns are good predictors of whether targets will be subsequently divested. While
this market-based measure of performance has been challenged (Malkiel 2003), abnormal returns are a
common, well-established measure of acquisition performance in strategy and finance (Bradley et al.
1988; Singh and Montgomery 1987).
Abnormal returns are calculated using residual analysis of the market model (Fama et al. 1969).
Based on the acquisition announcement date, we set the event date at t=0. We then estimated the baseline
market model for the 241-day period [-260, -20] using the formula: rit = αi + βi rmt + εit , where rit is the
common stock return of firm i on day t, rmt is the corresponding daily market return on the CRSP valueweighted index, αi and βi are firm-specific parameters and εit is the error term. The estimates obtained
from the market model were then used to predict returns for each acquiring firm through the formula: r̂ it
= α̂ i + β̂ i rmt, where r̂ it is the predicted return and α̂ i and β̂ i are the model estimates. The daily firmlevel abnormal returns were calculated as: ε̂ it = rit - r̂ it. Finally, the cumulative abnormal return of firm
i during the event window period was calculated using the formula: CARi = t ε̂ it. We obtained returns
over several short and medium time windows surrounding the acquisition announcement, including [-1,0],
[-1,1], [-5,0], [-5,1], [-5,5], [-10,0],[-10,10],[-15,0], and [-15,15]. Our findings are stable throughout all
the windows, which we report in more detail below. For ease of presentation, we report our findings using
the 11-day period [-5, 5]. In a supplementary analysis, we also discuss findings for long event windows
ranging between 36 to 60 months.
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Independent Variables
Prior alliance with target. We created the binary variable Prior Alliance, coded as 1 if the
acquirer had prior alliance with target preceding the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. All the alliances in this
study represent relationships in which the firms reached a formal agreement to exchange or commit
resources. Also, if the acquirer had more than one prior alliance with the target, the earliest alliance
between the partners is chosen as the focal alliance.
Prior international alliance. The binary variable Foreign Target is coded as 1 if the acquirer had
prior alliance with an international firm preceding the acquisition, and 0 otherwise. Since all the acquirers
in our study are headquartered in the US, international targets consist of non-US companies.
Alliance Strength. We identified five types of prior alliances in our study: R&D, marketing,
supplier, licensing, and equity only. We determined the type of alliance through a text analysis of the
press release announcing the formation of the partnership, which contain clear statements of the purpose
of the alliance and brief descriptions of the activities involved (see Appendix for examples). We
categorized alliances into one of the five types only if the press release was unambiguous about the
purpose of the relationship. In instances where the firms had more than one type of alliance, we coded the
alliance type that was strongest in terms of interaction between the alliance partners.
We measure alliance strength based on the opportunities each tie creates for partner-specific
learning. Prior research suggests that relationships formed to generate new knowledge, products, and
unique combinations of each partner‘s capabilities involve the highest levels of interaction (Nohria and
Garcia-Pont 1991). Scholars generally agree that R&D partnerships fit such a description (e.g. Anand and
Khanna 2000a). Our search of alliance announcements revealed that marketing agreements also involved
intense collaboration based on co-commercialization of products in multiple markets, and that they often
were accompanied by product development tasks. Notice from the Appendix, for example, that the
marketing alliance between HP and Verifone involved ―collaborative activities in other areas [besides
joint selling],‖ the participation of a ―multitalented team,‖ and the ―uniting of efforts across the board—in
marketing, sales, and research.‖ We note that the marketing alliances in our sample go beyond simple
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distribution agreements—which other research has rightly classified as weak (Contractor and Lorange
1988). Thus, both R&D and marketing alliances require high resource commitments from partners,
mutual trust, interdependence and learning through joint problem solving; consequently we classify them
together as the strongest type.
We consider supplier alliances as the second strongest because the buyer and supplier often
collaborate to solve problems and share quality and productivity benefits. Monczka et al. (1998) find that
a successful supplier alliances exhibit characteristics that include ―trust and coordination,
interdependence, information quality and participation, information sharing, joint problem solving,
avoiding the use of severe conflict resolution tactics‖ (p. 553). However, supplier alliances do not involve
the co-development of knowledge and products to the same extent as marketing or R&D ties.
Licensing alliances are weaker than supplier relations because they involve well-defined transfers
of property rights (Mowery et al. 1996). The contract between the firms is clear and relatively
unambiguous, with well-specified clauses and thus more easily enforceable (Anand and Khanna 2000b).
Accordingly, licensing agreements require fewer resource commitments, less interdependence, and less
joint problem solving by partners than do stronger relationships. Anand and Khanna‘s (2000a) finding
that learning effects are stronger in the case of research joint ventures than of licensing contracts supports
our reasoning. Equity-only relationships represent the weakest forms of alliances we found in the sample.
We note that what we call equity-only ties are not equity joint ventures in which partners set up a separate
legal entity in which both firms own a share and also tend to collaborate actively. Instead, as the text in
the Appendix indicates, these are much more passive investments with the goal of obtaining partial
control and sometimes voting rights.
According to the foregoing discussion, we created the variable Prior Alliance Strength in which
we assigned each kind of tie an increasing strength score—1 for equity-only, 2 for licensing, 3 for
supplier, and 4 for marketing or R&D. In robustness checks, we modified Prior Alliance Strength by
creating a five-point scale in which marketing or R&D ties received the highest rating. Moreover, we also
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created the indicator Prior Strong Alliance, which is coded as 1 for R&D, marketing, and supplier ties,
and 0 otherwise. Our results led to the same conclusions regardless of the measure alliance strength used.

Control Variables
We control for several alternative factors that could affect the performance of acquisitions. A
common acquisition characteristic studied by scholars is whether target and acquirer industries are related
or not (Singh and Montgomery 1987). To account for relatedness, we include the variable Related
Acquisition, coded as 1 if the target and acquirer primarily operate in the same industry (measured
through the two-digit SIC code), and 0 otherwise. Further, the complexity of the acquisition transaction
could itself affect its performance because more complex transactions may indicate difficulty in
determining the value of the target. We control for this through the variable Considerations, a count of the
number of payment types (considerations) offered for the target firm, such as cash, stock, and so on.
We include two important characteristics of the acquiring firm that could affect performance. We
control for the acquirer‘s size through the variable Acquirer Total Assets. We also include the variable
Acquisition Experience, measured as the number of all acquisitions completed by the acquirer in the five
years preceding the observed acquisition in our sample (Hayward 2002). While acquisition experience is
not a direct measure of acquisition prowess, it seems reasonable to expect a strong positive correlation
between number of previous acquisitions and acquisition capabilities. We also measured this variable for
several other time periods, ranging from three to ten years prior to the observed acquisition, and our
findings remain unchanged.
Characteristics of the target firm should also influence acquisition outcomes. We mentioned in
our theory that international strategies carry with them an inherent liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995).
Thus, foreign targets are particularly difficult to evaluate and integrate. We control for this possibility
through the indicator Foreign Target, coded as 1 if the target firm not from the US and 0 otherwise. We
note that this variable overlaps with the indicator of whether the prior alliance was international—
however, there are international acquisitions without prior alliances in our study as well. One of the
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virtues of our sample is that it includes both public and private target firms. While this enhances the
generalizability of our findings, it could be that acquiring private firms is more profitable than acquiring
public ones. We thus include the indicator Public Target, coded as 1 if the target is publicly listed, and 0
otherwise.
Finally, we account for target industry and time period effects that could affect the findings. We
include indicators for five broad industry groups—light manufacturing, heavy manufacturing,
transportation and communications, software and services, and other services. To control for acquisition
performance driven solely by timing issues, we include separate dummy variables for each year in the
sample, with the first year (1990) being the reference period. For clarity of presentation, our tables do not
show coefficient estimates for the industry and year indicators, but they are included in every model.

Model
We test our first hypothesis by regressing CARi on Prior Alliance, as represented by the
following equation:
CARi = β0 + β1*Prior Alliancei + β2*Controls + εi.

(1)

The argument behind H1 is that forming an alliance before acquiring a target can be a superior
acquisition strategy in knowledge-intensive industries. If firms are aware of the advantages of forming
prior alliances, then our findings could exhibit endogeneity driven by selection bias—that is, superior
firms may intentionally select to engage in prior alliances at a higher rate than inferior firms. Thus, the
OLS coefficient estimates of Prior Alliance could be biased upward due to self-selection. To account for
this possibility, we estimated equation (1) using Maddala‘s (1983) treatment-effects estimator, which
accounts for the potential endogeneity of Prior Alliance. This two-step estimator first models the
probability of selecting the ‗treatment‘ (in our case, equation (2) below) through a probit model, and then
accounts for that probability in a second-stage least-squares model (equation (1) above). Applied to our
scenario, the first-stage equation is as follows:
Prior Alliancei = β0 + β1*Alliance Experiencei + β2*Xi + μi.
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(2)

The variable Alliance Experience is a predictor of the probability of forming Prior Alliance that is
not included in the second-stage equation (1). A voluminous literature on alliance formation finds that
previous alliance experience is positively related to subsequent alliance formation (e.g. Gulati 1995,
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). Alliance experience is measured as the number of alliances formed during and
extended time window before the observed alliance in our sample. We used different experience
windows, ranging from three to ten years, and our findings were unaltered. The term Xi contains other
predictors of alliance formation that are also included in our second stage equation—Acquirer Total
Assets, Related Alliance (i.e. same two-digit SIC code), Public Target, and dummies for each year and
target industry group. From this analysis, we found that alliance experience was a good predictor of
alliance formation (p < 0.01) in the first stage equation. However, we tested for and found that Maddala‘s
(1983) λ parameter is far from significant (p = 0.87), indicating that the error terms of the two equations
are uncorrelated, and thus suggesting that selection bias does not exist in our sample.
To test our other three hypotheses, we restrict our sample to a subset of observations that have
formed prior alliances (H3 and H4), or that have engaged in foreign acquisitions (H2). For example, to
test H3 and H4 we restrict Prior Alliance to equal 1, and given this condition estimate the following
equation:
(CARi | Prior Alliance = 1) = β0 + β1*Prior Alliance Strengthi + β2*Foreign Targeti + β3*Controls + εi. (3)

We expect the coefficients of Prior Alliance Strength and Foreign Target to be positive and
significant in support of H4 and H3, respectively. While in this case we are only looking within the subset
of acquisitions that had prior alliances, it may be necessary to account for self-selection into this subset
for the same reasons just discussed. To explore whether endogeneity is a concern, we estimated equation
(3) via Heckman‘s (1979) selection model, which also predicts the likelihood of forming Prior Alliance in
a first-stage regression (in our case, via equation (2)). In the second stage, however, equation (3) is
estimated only for the subset of acquisitions for which Prior Alliance = 1, but taking into account the
probability of forming a prior alliance. As in the treatment model, Alliance Experience is a significant
predictor of alliance formation (p < 0.05), but the likelihood-ratio (LR) test of independent equations
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failed to reject the null hypothesis that selection bias does not exist in our sample (p = 0.44). (A similar
reasoning applies to H2, where we restrict the sample to only foreign acquisitions, but we omit the details
because the solution is analogous).
Given that self-selection bias is not a concern in our sample, we opted to use the traditional OLS
estimator to test our hypotheses via equations (1) and (3). However, we do so with the confidence that our
coefficient estimates are not plagued by endogeneity concerns. We note that our findings regarding the
hypotheses are the same if we use OLS than if we use Maddala‘s (1983) and Heckman‘s (1979) controls
for self-selection, which further suggests that the OLS estimator is unbiased in this case. We also refined
our regression model to account for the non-independence of observations. Given that some acquirers are
repeated in our sample, it is likely that their acquisitions are not independent of each other, which may
lead to improper standard error estimates. To correct for this, we estimate all standard errors in the
regressions using the ‗sandwich‘ estimator (Huber 1967), which also accounts for heteroskedasticity.

Results
Table 1 presents a detailed summary of daily and cumulative abnormal returns. Panel A displays
the average daily abnormal return for all firms in the sample and provides a sense for the fluctuation of
returns surrounding acquisition announcements. Panel B summarizes the cumulative abnormal returns for
several windows around the announcement day, along with various tests of whether the returns are
different from the average market return leading up to the event. Consistent with our primary interest in
explaining the cross sectional variation in our measure of acquisition performance, Panel C presents the
average returns for the [-5, 5] window—which we use in our regression analysis—for various subsamples
of interest. We also plotted the daily abnormal returns for the same subgroups in Figures 2a through 2c.
Counter to our expectations for H1, Panel C of Table 1 reveals that acquisitions without prior alliances
exhibit higher average returns than those with prior alliances. Figure 2a further shows that the daily
returns closely track each other for the groups with and without prior ties. Consistent with H3, the
subgroup with previous foreign alliances shows a higher average return than the group with domestic
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prior alliances—a fact visually confirmed by Figure 2b. As expected from H4, acquisitions with stronger
prior alliances (R&D, marketing, or supplier) show higher average returns over the [-5, 5] window than
those preceded by weaker ties (licensing or equity-only) in both Panel C of Figure 1 and in Figure 2c. We
now turn to our regression analysis, in which we confirm the initial evidence provided by the preceding
descriptive analysis.
***Insert Table 1 about Here***
***Insert Figures 2a-2c about Here***
Table 2 shows summary statistics and correlations, and Table 3 presents the results from the
regressions. Model 1 includes the control variables, of which only Considerations is marginally
significant (p < 0.10) and positive. We test our first hypothesis in Model 2 by including Prior Alliance in
the regression. Contrary to our expectations, the effect of having an alliance before the acquisition is not
significant, thus failing to provide support for H1. We next turn to our second hypothesis, which predicts
that for the subset of international acquisitions, those involving prior alliances will exhibit better
performance than those without such alliances. To test this, we restrict the sample in Model 3 only to
international acquisitions, which brings the sample size down to 87 observations (note that the coefficient
for Foreign Target drops out of this model). In support of H2, we find that Prior Alliance is positive and
significant (p < 0.05). In international settings, acquirers with a prior alliance gain an additional 6.6%
increase in abnormal stock returns relative to acquirers without a prior alliance.
***Insert Table 2 about Here***
The third hypothesis provides additional nuance to the international context, by predicting that
within the set of firms with prior alliances (i.e. Prior Alliance = 1), foreign acquisitions will perform
better than domestic ones. To test this, we limit the sample to acquisitions with prior alliances, and find
that the coefficient of Foreign Target is positive and significant (p < 0.01) in support of H3. International
acquisitions with prior alliances exhibit abnormal returns that are 5.7% higher than domestic acquisitions
with prior alliances. Model 5 tests our final hypothesis, which predicts that engaging in stronger alliances
prior to acquisition leads to superior M&A performance than engaging in prior weaker alliances before
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the acquisition. In support of H4, we find that Prior Alliance Strength is positive and significant (p <
0.05), providing a 1.1% improvement in abnormal returns for every additional level of strength—thus,
R&D and marketing ties (strength = 4) produce returns 3.3% higher than equity only relationships
(strength = 1). We note that Foreign Target remains significant in this model (p < 0.01) as H3 predicts.
***Insert Table 3 about Here***
Supplementary Analyses. We conducted a number of supplementary analyses and robustness
checks to further bolster confidence in our findings. As mentioned previously, we used multiple event
windows to measure abnormal returns (see the description of the dependent variable for a detailed list).
Our findings are generally stable when using these alternative windows. H1 is not supported as in our
main analysis, while H2-H4 are in half or more of the alternative time frames. In addition, we created an
interaction between Prior Strong Alliance and Foreign Target with the objective of assessing whether the
combination of these conditions, which per our arguments help reduce information asymmetry, creates an
additional acquisition performance benefit over and above the main effects of those two conditions
separately. The interaction was marginally significant (p < 0.10).
Finally, while we make a case above for selecting the 1990-1998 years as the most appropriate
period for our analysis, we assessed whether our findings are affected by our choice of sampling period.
First, we analyzed whether the hypotheses hold in the highly volatile 1999-2004 time frame. As before,
we found no support for H1, suggesting that prior alliances per se did not improve acquisition
performance. Also in line with our main analysis, prior international alliances (H2 and H3) were
positively and significantly related to performance. Contrary to expectations, however, the effect of strong
prior alliances on M&A performance was not significant, though still positive. Second, in line with prior
research identifying the early months of the year 2000 as the unraveling of the tech bubble (Uhlenbruck et
al. 2006), we extended our sample until the end of both 1999 and 2000. In this case, the findings were
entirely consistent with our primary analysis—we found no support for H1, but did for H2-H4.
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DISCUSSION
In an effort to understand the conditions under which some acquirers earn superior returns for their
stockholders, we identified prior alliances with targets as a possible mechanism to mitigate the ex ante
and ex post problems of information asymmetry between knowledge acquirers and potential target firms.
We invoke the concept of partner-specific absorptive capacity (Dyer and Singh, 1998) as implying a deep
understanding of knowledge-intensive targets by potential acquirers which alleviates both pre- and postacquisition information asymmetry. We contribute to the literature by theorizing that partner-specific
absorptive capacity is enhanced through prior alliances with targets and is particularly useful in
ameliorating information asymmetry both in international acquisitions and when prior target alliances are
stronger rather than weaker.
Our finding for H1 was contrary to our expectations: we found that prior target alliances did not
significantly improve acquisition performance for knowledge acquisitions in general. This result is
surprising, particularly in view of the strong theoretical arguments in its favor. It also goes against the
findings of the limited prior empirical research on this issue by Porrini (2004), who did find a generally
positive effect of prior target alliances on acquisition performance. However, the restricted acquisition
data set in that study – which included only 31 prior alliances – as well as the reliance on ROA change,
which can include a number of confounding influences, warrants further investigation. In contrast,
research by Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) offers a precedent for the notion that no general effect exists for
alliances prior to acquisitions, which suggests that the effect of prior alliances may be contingent on other
factors, although these scholars do not investigate what the other factors may be.
One explanation for the lack of support for the first hypothesis may be that in fact no general
benefit of knowledge acquisitions with prior target alliances exists, except under certain more specific
conditions. Such a result would be consistent with the idea that in general, prior alliances, even in
knowledge-intensive industries, do not offer a private information benefit because public information on
the knowledge assets of high-tech targets is usually sufficient (captured by patents, FDA filings and the
like). Alternatively, it could be that not all types of alliances are equally useful in helping acquirers assess
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knowledge assets. For example, a weak alliance by itself may not be sufficiently informative of the
target‘s intangible knowledge assets, and it is only when alliances are strong that the acquirer is able to
access the target‘s embedded information and knowledge.
Since total alliances include both strong and weak alliances, we investigated this possibility
further by testing the effects on acquisition performance of weak alliances alone compared to not having a
prior alliance at all. The results are interesting – we actually find that prior weak alliances exert a
significant negative effect on acquisition performance relative to no prior alliance, which may reflect the
fact that the cost of creating and sustaining weak alliances is higher than the private information benefit
they provide prior to an acquisition. Thus, it appears that the negative effect of weak alliances is pulling
down the effect of other types of prior alliances on acquisition performance compared to not having prior
alliances before acquiring—resulting in no overall effect of prior alliances on acquisition performance.
Our result on the negative effects of weak alliances relative to no alliances echoes recent work by Li et al.
(2008) which finds that firms prefer to form new alliances with strangers rather than with weak ties.
As hypothesized, we did find a strong effect of prior alliances on international knowledge
acquisitions. The effect is apparent both in international knowledge acquisitions following target
alliances against international knowledge acquisitions without prior alliances (H2), as well as in
international knowledge acquisitions with prior alliances relative to domestic knowledge acquisitions with
prior alliances (H3). These results are strongly supportive of our thesis which, building on the
international management literature, argued that the greater information asymmetry in international
contexts arising the ‗liability of foreignness‘ yields a positive effect on acquisition announcement because
of the greater potential and need for learning via partner-specific absorptive capacity through prior
alliances. In other words, the market recognizes the greater possibilities of alliance learning and the
reduction in information asymmetry when the target is an international one. From the controls, it is
noteworthy that domestic vs. foreign acquisitions by themselves do not vary in performance, but differ
only when international acquisitions are preceded by an alliance between the target and the acquirer—
which makes a more nuanced case for the existence of partner-specific absorptive capacity. The data
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suggest that rather than international strategies per se being valuable, they must be executed with a deep
awareness of the need for partner-specific learning and coupled with a prior alliance that enhances
understanding about the international target.
Our final set of results is also noteworthy: as expected, we find that stronger prior alliances yield
superior acquisition performance than weaker prior alliances. We defined alliance strength in terms of the
intensity of interaction between the potential target and acquirer firms, indicating that acquisition
performance improves when greater partner-specific learning has occurred via the more intimate and
intense interaction arising from stronger alliances. This theoretical mechanism is further bolstered when
we consider the results for the interaction of prior international alliances with strong alliances, which
yield a positive, though marginally significant, effect. This finding suggests that in cases which combine
high information asymmetry and intense interaction with the potential target, strong alliances work to
enhance partner-specific absorptive capacity and reduce information asymmetry to an even greater extent
than weaker forms of alliances in domestic settings. The combination of findings regarding international
vs. domestic (H2-H3) and strong vs. weak alliances (H4) provide compelling, though indirect, evidence
that partner-specific absorptive capacity may be the mechanism behind our observed M&A performance.
In order to conduct sensitivity tests over a more recent time frame, albeit one which exhibits high
volatility in total acquisition and alliance activity, we tested our hypotheses during the period 1999-2004.
We find that the performance advantages of prior international alliances (H2-H3) still accrue to acquirers
(p < 0.01), while the benefits of prior strong alliances relative to weak ones (H4) are not statistically
significant. Considering the evidence from Figure 1 that this period clearly exhibited high volatility, we
are cautious when interpreting these findings. One reason for these findings could be that the proportion
of weak alliances in the 1999-2004 data is only 25%, compared to 47% in the 1990-1998 sample—thus,
the variance in weak alliances may be too limited to pick up an effect. More substantively, this suggests
that firms are increasingly gravitating to stronger alliances over time, perhaps recognizing the learning
benefits derived from greater interaction intensity between two firms. Yet another interpretation might be
that in lean times (such as the post-2001 years), firms are much stricter about the risks involved in
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acquisitions and go for safer bets in which the benefits of prior alliances, even if strong, do not emerge.
On the other hand, with international acquisitions, the essential asymmetry in the context-specific
knowledge stays in place, and thus the risk cannot be easily mitigated.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it focuses on the broad conditions
under which acquiring firms create value for their shareholders, in our case the existence of certain types
of prior alliances before acquisitions. While prior studies mostly emphasize that almost two-thirds of all
acquisitions fail, one third of acquisitions clearly succeed. Thus, what makes an acquisition a failure or
success is an important research issue in organization and management literatures. Second, not only does
our study identify prior alliances with target as a potentially useful pre-acquisition strategy, but also it
goes further to identify still more nuanced contingencies that make this strategy valuable—such as the
type of target, whether international or domestic, and the type of alliance, whether strong or weak.
Finally, our results, while not conclusive, support the explanation that the reduction in information
asymmetry, accomplished through increased partner-specific absorptive capacity, between the potential
acquirer and target firms may be the causal mechanism that accounts for the results. By presenting this
reasoning we offer a credible explanation for the typically poor performance of acquisitions and highlight
one potential solution to soften the information asymmetry pitfalls inherent in them.
Our study has limitations that future research may address. While we present compelling indirect
evidence of partner-specific learning and reduction in information asymmetry, we do not directly test for
learning as an intermediate step between alliance formation and acquisition performance. Future research
may attempt to more directly relate the outcomes to the theorized intervening processes, such as learning
or trust. A promising direction for future research would be to measure the extent of direct knowledge
transfer occurring after the formation of the alliance but before the acquisition. A possible approach
would be to capture the pattern of patent cross-citations in setting where patents are central to the
knowledge-creation and learning process (such as the biochemistry industry). While this approach would
have helped us provide more direct evidence of learning in this study, we note that a large number of
firms in our sample do not rely patents as primary conduits of knowledge creation.
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Another extension of our research would be to capture the different motivations for the
acquisitions themselves. Scholars have pointed out that M&A are conducted to serve many different
purposes, such as learning, market share, eliminating competition (Bower 2001), or international
expansion. These acquisition purposes could interact with the motivations for alliances formed prior to
the acquisition. Scholars could explore whether different performance outcomes more directly associated
with the acquisition motivation, such as market share or industry consolidation. While one of the major
virtues of our dataset is that we also include private firms, obtaining good data on these private
acquisition targets is difficult. Ideally, we would have liked to include additional controls—such as the
relative size of the acquirer and target, stock premiums and other market-based measures—in our
regressions, but the unavailability of quality data on private targets precluded the inclusion of these
variables.

Concluding Remarks
While considerable research on mergers and acquisitions focuses on the conditions under which
acquisitions create value, acquisitions of knowledge-intensive targets present special challenges arising
from the difficulties of assessing knowledge assets. Thus, strategies that alleviate problems of
information asymmetry, such as forming alliances prior to acquisitions, are particularly valuable for
acquirers. Our research contributes to the literature by theorizing about how alliances create partnerspecific absorptive capacity which contributes to a reduction in information asymmetry and consequently
higher acquisition performance in knowledge-based industries. Our findings indicate that while in
general prior alliances do not aid acquisition performance, they are beneficial under certain conditions—
specifically when information asymmetry is elevated in international contexts, and when prior alliances
require intense partner-specific learning. Together, the results support our thesis that partner-specific
absorptive capacity may be at work and suggest that given certain contingencies high-tech acquisitions
can indeed produce economic value.
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Figure 1
M&A and Alliance Volume – 1990-2004
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Figure 2a
Daily Abnormal Returns for Acquisitions with and without Prior Alliances
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Figure 2b
Daily Abnormal Returns for Foreign and Domestic Acquisitions with Prior Alliances

Figure 2c
Daily Abnormal Returns for Acquisitions with Prior Strong and Weak Alliances
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Table 1
Descriptive Statistics of Daily and Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Panel A: Average Daily Abnormal Returns (Full Sample)
Patell Z
Boehmer Z
Mean AR
Pos/Neg
-15
417
0.12%
0.606
0.564
1.02
-14
417
0.25%
1.340 +
0.945
0.95
-13
417
-0.02%
-0.021
-0.021
0.87
-12
417
-0.11%
-0.238
-0.236
0.90
-11
417
-0.18%
-0.668
-0.687
0.82
-10
417
-0.14%
-1.346 +
-1.323 +
0.77
-9
417
-0.06%
0.112
0.118
0.89
-8
417
0.31%
1.683 *
1.631 +
1.03
-7
417
-0.11%
-0.740
-0.724
0.84
-6
417
-0.31%
-1.655
-1.508 +
0.78
-5
417
0.12%
0.781
0.767
0.86
-4
417
-0.14%
-1.386 +
-1.376 +
0.85
-3
417
0.24%
1.352 +
1.229
0.94
-2
417
0.14%
0.221
0.204
1.06
-1
417
-0.01%
0.551
0.521
0.88
0
417
0.30%
1.600 +
1.134
1.03
1
417
0.11%
0.907
0.641
0.98
2
417
0.16%
1.508 +
1.453 +
0.95
3
417
0.00%
-0.853
-0.816
0.85
4
416
0.13%
0.873
0.870
1.02
5
416
-0.10%
-0.868
-0.856
0.86
6
416
-0.34%
-1.648
-1.460 +
0.85
7
416
0.22%
1.282 +
1.247
0.92
8
416
0.07%
0.597
0.594
0.98
9
416
-0.23%
-1.786 *
-1.766 *
0.83
10
416
-0.09%
-0.261
-0.231
0.81
11
416
-0.05%
-0.606
-0.648
0.92
12
416
0.01%
0.154
0.147
0.86
13
416
-0.10%
-0.436
-0.406
0.73
14
416
-0.23%
-1.592 +
-1.584 +
0.71
15
416
0.00%
0.206
0.191
0.85
Panel B: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Various Windows (Full Sample)
Patell Z
Boehmer Z
Window
N
Mean AR
Pos/Neg
(-15,+15)
417
0.01%
-0.045
-0.048
0.93
(-10,+10)
417
0.31%
0.193
0.196
1.00
(-5,+5)
417
0.96%
1.370 +
1.236
1.14
(-5,+1)
417
0.76%
1.501 +
1.306 +
1.21
(-1,+1)
417
0.40%
1.773
1.316 +
0.91
(-1,0)
417
0.29%
1.530
1.237
0.93
Panel C: Cumulative Abnormal Returns in [-5,5] (Various Subsamples)
Patell Z
Boehmer Z
Subsample
N
Mean AR
Pos/Neg
Prior Alliance
211
0.57%
-0.120
-0.105
0.92
No Prior Alliance
206
1.37%
2.071 *
1.943 *
1.42
Prior Foreign
49
4.43%
2.298 *
1.766 *
1.23
Prior Domestic
162
-0.60%
-1.401 +
-1.300 +
0.84
Prior Strong
128
1.44%
0.459
0.375
0.88
Prior Weak
83
-0.77%
-0.761
-0.750
0.98
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Day

N
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Rank Z
0.250
0.460
-0.670
-0.880
-0.780
-1.670
0.010
1.560
-0.690
-2.010
0.550
-1.040
0.810
0.880
0.000
1.040
0.380
0.750
-1.210
0.840
-0.860
-1.320
0.870
0.590
-1.800
-0.790
-0.990
-0.290
-1.250
-2.140
-0.540

*
+
*

+

*

*

Rank Z
-1.786 *
-0.678
0.646
0.991
0.823
0.737
Rank Z
-0.259
1.159
1.761 *
-1.256
-0.262
-0.089

Table 2
Summary Statistics and Correlations

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variable
Performance
Related Acquisition
Public Target
Considerations
Acquirer Total Assets
Acquisition Experience
Foreign Target
Prior Alliance
Prior Alliance Strength

Mean
0.01
0.63
0.16
1.25
3914.18
7.29
0.21
0.50
2.85

Descriptive Statistics
SD
Min
0.12
-0.33
0.48
0
0.36
0
0.59
1
10192.38
2.57
10.04
0
0.41
0
0.50
0
1.25
1

Max
0.79
1
1
5
81091
72
1
1
4

1

2

3

Correlations
4
5

6

7

8

-0.041
-0.015
0.146
-0.058
-0.076
0.035
-0.033
0.063

0.073
-0.037
-0.090
-0.002
0.068
-0.001
-0.008

-0.028
0.094
0.074
-0.104
-0.005
0.139

-0.111
-0.105
-0.057
-0.018
-0.002

-0.068
-0.028
-0.008

0.060
-0.012

N/A^

^ Prior Alliance Strength is observed only if Prior Alliance = 1. Thus, the correlation between the two variables is undefined.

43

0.639
-0.051
0.014
0.018

Table 3
Effects of Prior Alliances on Acquisition Performance
Dependent variable: Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-5,5]
(Standard Errors in Parentheses)

Hypothesis Tested
Constant
Related Acquisition
Public Target
Considerations
Acquirer Total Assets
Acquisition Experience
Foreign Target

Model 1
Controls

Model 2
H1

Model 3
H2

Model 4
H3

Model 5
H4

0.044
(0.036)
-0.018
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.016)
0.024 +
(0.013)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
0.012
(0.017)

0.051
(0.036)
-0.018
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.016)
0.024 +
(0.013)
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.001)
0.013
(0.017)
-0.010
(0.012)

0.109
(0.104)
-0.027
(0.037)
-0.033
(0.052)
-0.023
(0.028)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.002
(0.003)

0.029
(0.060)
-0.020
(0.017)
0.010
(0.023)
0.058 ***
(0.017)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.002 *
(0.001)
0.056 **
(0.023)

0.003
(0.062)
-0.020
(0.017)
0.004
(0.023)
0.059 ***
(0.017)
0.000
(0.000)
-0.002 *
(0.001)
0.057 **
(0.023)

Prior Alliance

0.066 *
(0.035)

Prior Alliance Strength
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

R-squared (F-value)
Firm-Years^

0.090
407

0.091
407

0.165
87

0.212 ***
206

0.011 *
(0.006)
Y
Y
0.221 ***
206

+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
^ The sample size varies in each model for the following reasons:
Models 1 and 2 - contain acquisitions with or without prior alliances, as per H1
Model 3 - restricted to international acquisitions only, as per H2
Models 4 and 5 - restricted to acquisitions with prior alliances, as per H3 and H4
Note: The dependent variable in the regressions is the level of abnormal returns for each firm (rather than the
difference between subgroups of interest). We test for differences in CARs between groups with and without prior
alliances through the variables prior alliance, foreign target, and prior alliance strength depending on the relevant
hypothesis.
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Appendix
Examples of Public Announcements of Different Alliance Types
Type
Equity

Partners
Viewlogic
Sunrise Test
Systems

Licensing

Cisco
American Internet
Co.

Supplier

Solectron
Ericsson

R&D

Schering-Plough
Canji Inc.

Marketing

Hewlett-Packard
Verifone Inc.

Relevant Text
7 June 1993. Viewlogic Systems… today announced that it has
reached an agreement to make a direct investment in Sunrise Test
Systems… Under the terms of the investment with Sunrise, a
Viewlogic executive will sit as an observer on Sunrise's board of
directors.
20 April 1998. American Internet…and Cisco Systems today
announced a multi-year, multi-million dollar agreement under which
Cisco…will OEM American Internet's Network Registrar products as
part of its CiscoAssure Policy Networking initiative.
25 March 1997. Solectron Corporation…today announced the
signing of a memorandum…with Ericsson Telecom AB to establish a
strategic, global manufacturing partnership…Ericsson’s Infocom
Systems…has chosen Solectron as one of its primary outsourcing
partners. This relationship will position Solectron as a preferred
supplier for Ericsson…
26 October 1994. Schering-Plough Corp. and Canji… announced a
strategic research agreement to develop new cancer treatments
based on Canji's proprietary scientific discoveries with p53 gene
therapy technology… Robert P. Luciano, Schering-Plough [CEO
said,] “…this effort promises to harness a new therapeutic
technology to reverse or suppress an underlying cause of cancer.''
… Additional p53-based treatments for other cancers would be
expected to follow; as approximately 50 percent of all human
cancers are associated with defective p53 genes…Schering-Plough
will be responsible for toxicology, safety and clinical trials.
6 May 1996. Hewlett-Packard…and Verifone today announced a
broad global agreement to provide their scalable paymentprocessing solution to financial-services institutions. The two
companies jointly will market and sell Verifone's Omnihost 2.0
client-server software application running on the HP 9000 family of
enterprise servers … HP and Verifone's agreement also calls for
collaborative activities in other areas, including Internet
commerce and smart-card applications… "Combining Verifone's
leadership and expertise as a global provider of security-enhanced
payment solutions and HP's well-known technical and industry
strengths results in a multitalented team able to effectively address
customer needs," said George Hoyem, vice president, Software
Marketing Group for Verifone. "By uniting our efforts across the
board -- in marketing, sales and research -- we can enable the
financial-services industry to streamline payment processing."
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